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Abstract 
Human fertility has never been so varied. In some countries the average number of births per woman is close to one, only half the 
level required for long term stability of population size. In other countries the average woman is having six to seven births. The 
possible reasons for this diversity and the consequences are discussed. The problems of excessively high fertility are probably 
more easily solved than those of very low fertility. Much experience has been gained over the past 40 years in how to reduce 
childbearing, mainly by high quality family planning programs with accompanying publicity to legitimize the idea of small 
families and use of modern contraception. Conversely, successful experience at raising fertility is much less common and the 
future of very low fertility countries remains uncertain. The paper concludes that fertility in the range of 1.7 to 2.3 births, 
implying modest long term decline or increase in population is probably optimal. 
© 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Trends in Human Fertility 
Introduction 
The number of children born per woman and the timing of births is directly relevant to public health and human 
welfare in many ways. The level of childbearing, for instance, determines the demand for obstetric and child health 
services and has a direct effect on the maternal mortality rate. The age pattern of childbearing influences the 
incidence of obstetric complications, because pregnancies in the early teenage years and at ages over 35 years pose 
an increased risk to the mother. Fecundity also declines after age 35 years, and thus postponement of births will 
increase the need for assisted reproduction. The spacing of births has important health implications; conceptions 
occurring within 24 months of a previous live birth are at elevated risk of fetal death, prematurity, low birth weight 
for gestational age, and infant mortality. Unintended pregnancies may result in induced abortion, which in many 
countries is restricted and unsafe. 
Fertility also affects socio-economic welfare. Birth rates are the crucial determinant of population growth (or 
decline) and the age structure of populations, and both factors have profound socio-economic implications. The 
links between population dynamics and economic development have been a matter of controversy for decades. On 
commonsense grounds it seems rather obvious that countries growing at 2% per year or more (implying a doubling 
in population size every 36 years or less) face greater difficulties in escaping from poverty and illiteracy than other 
countries, mainly because nearly half the population is aged under 15 years, thus placing a heavy dependency 
burden on the adult population. However economists could find little empirical evidence to support this view until 
recently. This more recent work has been able to exploit a longer time series of data and, by disaggregating 
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population growth into its components (fertility, mortality, age structure), has reached more definite conclusions.  
When fertility falls, an immediate benefit in terms of a reduction in the youth dependency burden is achieved. A 
medium term benefit then follows for several decades when the labor force is proportionately large, the dependency 
burden is atypically low, and prospects for making rapid socio-economic progress are specially bright. This era is 
inevitably followed by a return to a high dependency burden because of an increase in the elderly population, which 
poses a strain on governmentsÿ health and welfare budgets. 
The sequence is well illustrated by the case of the Republic of Korea (Figure 1). By 1960, mortality had already 
declined but fertility remained high at about six births per woman and the population was growing at 2.8% per year. 
At that time, 42% of the total population was aged under 15 years but only 3% were aged 65 or more. In the next 40 
years, fertility fell sharply and by 2000 the number of births per woman was about 1.4 and the growth rate had 
abated to 0.6% per year. Between 1960 and 2000 the number of working-age adults (15-64 years) per 100 
dependents rose from 120 to 250. Between 2000 and 2040 it is projected that the proportion of Koreaÿs population 
aged 65 or more will rise from 7.4% to 30.5% and the ratio of workers to dependents will have fallen from 250 to 
137 per 100 dependents. All industrialized countries now face similar problems of population ageing and some face 
the prospect of appreciable decline in population size. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Between 1950 and 2005 the global fertility rate halved from about five to 2.5 births. Under conditions of 
moderate to low mortality, a little over two births per woman is required to bring about long-term stabilisation of 
population size. Thus, the world as a whole may be approaching the end of an era of sustained growth, from one 
billion in 1830 to 6.5 billion in 2005 and a projected total of 9.2 billion in 2050 (United Nations 2006). However, 
these global figures mask huge differences between regions and countries. The level of childbearing in most 
industrialized countries has fallen well below the two-child mark and therefore these countries face the possibility of 
population decline, combined with population ageing. Conversely, many of the poorest countries in the world, 
mostly in Africa, still retain buoyant fertility levels and can expect substantial increases in population size. 
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This paper addresses the implications of human fertility for the future of the planet. Today the span of national 
fertility levels has never been wider. In some countries the average woman still bears seven children over a lifetime. 
At the other extreme, very low fertility, at little above one birth per woman is found in a growing number of 
countries. Both extremes pose serious challenges to human welfare. The persistence of high fertility in Africa is 
discussed first. 
High Fertility 
Though fertility in sub-Saharan Africa remains high on average, the sub-region is demographically diverse 
(Figure 2). In the Republic of South Africa and Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), vigorous family planning promotion 
started before the advent of majority rule and fertility in both countries, and in Botswana, is now at a relatively low 
level. HIV epidemics in Southern Africa are especially severe and thus falling fertility has been accompanied by 
rapidly rising mortality. These countries face an exceptionally abrupt end to an era of population growth. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
In contrast fertility decline in most of Western and Central Africa has barely started and HIV epidemics are 
modest in comparison with those in Southern Africa. Niger is one of about 12 countries expected to treble in size 
between now and 2050. The country is desperately poor and barely able to feed its current population of 15 million. 
It has lost half its arable land to drought and, in 2005, suffered a potentially serious food shortage that was only 
prevented from developing into a famine by international food aid. If the projected increase in population to 50 
million by mid-century is realized, it is extremely difficult to see any alternative but a continuation of mass poverty, 
illiteracy and food insecurity. Niger is unlikely to attract large inward investment because of low human capital and 
inherent civil insecurity. Remittances from migrants to Europe and increased uranium extraction may mitigate the 
situation but not on a sufficient scale to offer the country a bright future. Sharper than expected reductions in fertility 
and future population size surely have to be part of the solution. 
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Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 
2006 Revision. New York, United Nations 2007. 
 
In Eastern Africa, fertility decline has started in most countries, but most markedly in Kenya. In that country, a 
vigorous family planning effort was initiated in the early 1980s and, in the next 15 years, fertility fell from nearly 
eight to 4.8 births. Unexpectedly, the rate then plateaued, one likely reason being that funds and energy were 
diverted from family planning to HIV/AIDS. Between 1988 and 2003, the proportion of contraceptive users relying 
on government services dropped from 68% to 53% and the percentage of births reported by mothers as unwanted 
rose from 11% to 21% (Westoff and Cross, 2006). Both trends imply a deterioration of government services. In 
2002, the United Nations projected Kenya’s population in 2050 at 44 million. In 2004, this projection was raised to 
83 million mainly in response to the fertility stall but also to a reduction in expected AIDS-related mortality. The 
consequences for Kenya are likely to be severe. The fertile highlands are already densely settled and huge pressure 
on water resources already exists. Nairobi, the capital city, already has some of the largest slums in the region and 
the huge projected population increase will further fuel rural-urban migration. 
This sequence of events in Kenya may be an extreme example of a more pervasive trend throughout much of the 
region. Rather than gathering pace in the past 15 years, the trend towards lower fertility has faltered. In West and 
Central Africa, fertility typically remains close to six births per woman, contraceptive use prevalence among 
married women remains below 10% and desired family sizes are still high. The United Nations projects that fertility 
in sub-Saharan Africa will decline steadily to reach 2.5 births by mid-century. Even if this projection is accurate, 
Africaÿs population is set to rise from 0.77 billion in 2005 to 1.76 billion in 2050. 
Is the persistence of high fertility throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa simply a reflection of low socio-
economic development or of distinctive features of culture and social organization that set the region apart from 
Asia and Latin America? Certainly, standards of living for many Africans worsened in the 1990s but equally high 
levels of poverty and illiteracy did not stifle fertility transition in Asia, as trends in Bangladesh and Nepal since the 
1980s show. It is also true that countless surveys reveal that Africans attach a higher value to large families than 
citizens elsewhere. According to Caldwell, the explanation for this pronatalism lies in the subordination of the 
nuclear family to the lineage. For lineage leaders, the patriarchs, high fertility is advantageous because it enhances 
their prestige, power and patronage. Thus, they see children as sources of wealth rather than as drains on emotional 
and financial resources. A related explanation stems from the multiplicity of ethnic and linguistic groups in Africa, 
with the inevitable tension and conflict over resources that this diversity implies. A buoyant birth rate and numerical 
strength may well have conferred advantage in these circumstances, thus engendering strongly pronatalist values. 
Since the most recent International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, in 1994, policies to 
reduce population growth through family planning promotion have fallen from fashion and been replaced by a 
broader agenda of women’s reproductive health and rights. Many reasons for this shift have been proposed. New 
priorities, such as HIV/AIDS, and a sense that the problem of rapid population growth was largely solved are both 
implicated. But in most of Africa high fertility and rapid population growth represent more of a threat to the MDGs 
than HIV/AIDS. Moreover, of the 76 poorest countries of the world (with populations of 5 million or more), nearly 
half record a rate of population growth of 2% or more together with evidence of widespread unmet need for family 
planning (Figure 3). Most such countries are in Africa. 
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FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
A revitalization of the family planning agenda is now badly needed. This will require the re-forging of the 
population-poverty reduction link that was broken at Cairo. A champion is needed. Historically the USA has taken 
the lead but this will not happen at least until after the next election. An obvious advocacy role for China exists. 
Low Fertility 
In most of Europe and in North America fertility decline started in the late nineteenth century (well before the 
development of modern contraceptives) and birth rates fell to low levels in the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
giving rise to concerns about population decline. These concerns were short lived because, following the end of 
World War II, fertility rose in most industrialized countries and in some it continued to rise throughout the 1950s. 
This post-war baby boom was most pronounced in the USA where fertility climbed from 2.9 births in 1946 to peak 
at 3.7 births in 1957. Japan is the clearest exception: this country experienced a dramatic decline from 4.5 births in 
1947 to 2.0 births a decade later, partly in response to a shift from pro-to anti-natalist policies and liberalization of 
abortion laws. 
The mid-1960s marked the start of a second and unforeseen phase of fertility decline. By 1980, fertility in most 
countries had fallen below the replacement level of two births (Figure 4). In 2005, childbearing was below 1.5 births 
in Italy, Spain, Germany, Austria, the Russian Federation and much of Eastern Europe and also in the economically 
advanced East Asian states and territories (Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Republic of Korea). Some of this decline 
can be attributed to increased efficiency in the prevention of unintended births. The advent of oral contraception in 
the 1960s represented a decisive break of the sex-reproduction nexus. Access to legal abortion was also made easier 
in many countries. In 2000, about 20% of known pregnancies were legally terminated in France, Norway, Denmark, 
Italy, the United Kingdom and Sweden. This percentage exceeded 40% in many countries of the former Soviet 
Block and the Russian Federation itself (United Nations 2005). In the USA, the fraction of births reported by women 
as unwanted fell from 20% in the early 1960s to 7% by the late 1970s and the same trend no doubt occurred in many 
industrialized countries, though is less well documented. 
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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However, most commentators have sought explanations in more fundamental changes than improved birth 
control. The fertility decline in many industrialized countries has been accompanied and partly propelled by 
postponement of marriage and parenthood, rises in cohabitation, non-marital births and divorce, increased 
acceptance of diverse sexual lifestyles, and a growing independence of women. These interwoven features, dubbed 
the Āsecond demographic transitionā, represent an appreciable departure from marriage and parenthood as the 
central pillars of adult life. The key underlying cause is identified by some as the changing roles of women in 
society, together with the sluggish adaptation of men to this emancipation, 
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for instance by reluctance to shoulder a more equal share of the burden of housekeeping and child-rearing. The shift 
away from marriage and motherhood has been called Āthe revenge of women on menā. Paradoxically, however, 
the level of childbearing is lowest in countries where womenÿs labor force participation is also very low: Japan, 
Greece, Italy and Spain. It is also of note that these same countries have low proportions of non-marital births. Other 
experts, such as Ronald Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa, have sought an explanation in the development of broader 
þpost-modernÿ values of individualism, secularism and the desire for self-fulfillment. Compelling regionspecific 
explanations abound. For instance, the turbulence and insecurity caused by the break-up of the Soviet Block 
coincides with the period of sharpest decline in these countries. Given the economic, social and cultural diversity of 
the very low fertility countries, it seems unlikely that there is a single underlying cause. 
A sustained fertility rate of 1.5 births implies a halving of population size approximately every 65 years. At a life 
expectancy of 80 years it also implies an age structure where 28% of populations are aged 65 years or more and a 
ratio of workers (conventionally defined as ages 15-64) to old and young dependents of 1.5, compared to a ratio of 
about 2.0 in most industrialized countries today. A rise in life expectancy to 87 years changes the ratio to 1.4. While 
this prospect of population shrinkage is welcome to some environmental groups, it is regarded with alarm by many 
European and Asian governments. International migration on a sufficient scale to offset low birth rates and prevent 
population decline does not appear to be politically feasible. Hence, the main policy responses have been aimed at 
stimulating reproduction and have included generous maternity/paternity allowances (Sweden), child allowances 
that increase with parity (France), and cash payments at birth (Australia, Italy). Many other countries have shunned 
explicit pronatalist policies but have attempted to make family-building and work more compatible, for instance by 
better provision of infant care centers. None of these policies can claim long-term effectiveness at raising birth rates 
and the demographic futures of industrialized countries is uncertain (Gauthier, 1996). While most experts foresee 
the continuation of very low fertility, the United Nations envisages a slight but steady increase over the next 40 
years. One factor favoring an increase concerns postponement of births which depresses period rates but may not 
affect the number of children that women have over their life course. Sooner or later, the trend towards delayed 
childbearing must end and, when this happens, period fertility rates will increase typically by an average of 0.2-0.4 
births per woman (Lutz et al. 2003). It is also true that a two-child family remains a widespread aspiration despite 
downwards shifts in some countries (Goldstein et al. 2003). 
The anticipated decline in the number of workers to dependents is perhaps exaggerated as a problem. Even if 
fertility remains as low as 1.5 births per woman, raising retirement ages from 65 to 70 work bring the ratio back to 
its current level of 2.0. The effect of ageing on health and social support costs is likely to be more severe. Family 
support systems are a crucial consideration. In Europe the State bears much of the cost of caring for the elderly who 
are no longer able to live independently. Is this also the prospect for Asia or will strong tradition of family support 
endure? 
Conclusions 
For millennia, the human population grew at a miniscule rate because moderate fertility was matched by high, 
albeit fluctuating, mortality. The scientific and technological revolution of the past 200 years broke this 
demographic balance and gave rise to an unprecedented surge in human numbers. The past 50 years has seen a 
necessary and welcome return towards balance; fertility has fallen in most countries and world population may 
stabilize in the latter half of this century. Thus, the prospect of the Malthusian nightmare of famine and warfare, so 
prominently proclaimed in the 1960s by Paul Ehrlich and others, has receded. 
No consensus on the ideal level of fertility exists but a range of 1.7 to 2.3 births per woman has much to 
recommend it, as it implies modest growth or decline. As shown in this paper, the world is still far away from such a 
benign outcome. Fertility rates in many industrialized countries have plunged well below 1.7 while many poor 
countries have rates well above 2.3. Indeed, the fertility of nations has rarely been so diverse. Our demographic 
future is still uncertain. Will birth rates in Africa fall as fast and pervasively as in Asia and Latin America and will 
fertility edge steadily up in countries such as Japan and Italy? What happens in Africa is partly a matter of political 
priorities because a large body of successful experience at reducing fertility has accumulated. Policies to raise 
fertility do not have a successful track record and so trends in low-fertility countries are particularly difficult to 
predict. 
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